



Party Law in Modern Europe

The Legal Regulation of Political Parties in Post-War Europe

IT'S MOSTLY ABOUT MONEY!

**PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS SOURCES: REDUCING
CAUSAL COMPLEXITY
IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE**

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IT'S MOSTLY ABOUT MONEY!

PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS SOURCES: REDUCING CAUSAL COMPLEXITY IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

Abstract

Although much has been written about the process of party system institutionalization, the reasons why some party systems institutionalize remains a mystery. Seeking to solve such puzzle, and making use of three different methodological techniques (MDSO/MSDO, csQCA and process-tracing), this paper constitutes an attempt to explain what, how, and why some post-communist party systems institutionalized (while others have not). The conclusion is that while economic development is a sufficient condition party system institutionalization, the latter can also take place in countries with parliamentary concentration, cleavage cumulation and funding provisions for political parties. This latter finding is particularly interesting as previous studies tend to show mixed results.

Introduction

Although much has been written about the process of party system institutionalization in different regions: e.g. Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995), Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001), Southern (Morlino, 1998) or Eastern Europe (Rose and Munro, 2003), or East Asia (Stockton, 2001); the reasons why some party systems institutionalize while others do not remains still a mystery.

Studies trying to discover the sources of such systemic institutionalization tend to adopt either a quantitative (Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Horowitz and Browne, 2005; Tavits, 2005; Epperly, 2011) or a qualitative character (Meleshevich, 2007; Ufen, 2008) and, consequently, face the following dilemma: either they identify a certain number of variables affecting party system institutionalization in general, without specifying if they all apply to the different countries included in the analysis in the same manner, or they exclude from scratch certain variables and focus on the causal chain connecting certain “pre-conceived” factors with the dependent variable in a limited number of cases.

Seeking to solve the above-cited quandary, and using a mixed methods approach (MDSO/MSDO, csQCA and “process tracing”), this paper constitutes a first attempt to answer the following three questions: (1) what specific factors help party systems to institutionalize (or not)?; (2) which and how do they affect every particular party system?; and (3) what are the causal mechanisms behind such relationships?

With these goals in mind and in order to undertake such an ambitious enterprise the current work, adopting a “comprehensive” approach, reviews the literature on the causes of systemic institutionalization (section 2). Before that, the paper starts with an analytical perspective on the concept and measurement of party system institutionalization, establishing to what degree party systems in post-communist Eastern Europe have institutionalized (section 1). Trying to reduce “causal complexity”, the number of possible “key” variables is condensed to the minimum in section 3. Once the model has been specified section 4, dealing with the problem of “complex causation” (Ragin, 1987), identifies 5 different combinations of “conditioning” factors leading to the outcome. Finally, section 5 looks at the “causal mechanisms” linking each of the relevant “explanatory” sources with party system (under-)institutionalization in two “representative” case-studies.

Party System Institutionalization: Conceptualization and Operationalization

As it follows from the substantial body of literature devoted to the concept (Meleshevich, 2007; Randall and Svasand, 2002; Welfling, 1973), the notion of party system institutionalization has no established definition. Putting it very briefly, and summarizing a discussion sketched out elsewhere (Casal Bértoa, 2011), most authors dealing with the concept simply propose a series of “dimensions” (Morlino, 1998; Bielasiak, 2002; Grzymała-Busse, 2002), without paying much attention to the conceptualization itself.

Notwithstanding the latter, and despite the fact that no two scholars have arrived at the same final combination of dimensions of institutionalization, the truth is that all meanings of the conception of party system institutionalization contain the idea of stability and persistence in the rules and nature of inter-party competition (Lindberg, 2007; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mair, 2001; Przeworski, 1975). As a consequence, and bearing in mind that the core of a party system is to be found in the patterns of interaction among its subunits (i.e. political parties; see Sartori, 1976; Mair, 2006), I

consider party system institutionalization to be *the process by which the patterns of interaction among political parties become routine, predictable and stable over time* (Bakke and Sitter, 2005; Mair, 2001). In other words, a system of parties can be said to be institutionalized when political parties cooperate, collaborate and colligate in a standardized and structured way - a way that is independent of the relevant issues in each moment and which random shocks cannot alter (Mainwaring, 1998).

In order to assess the level of institutionalization in new “Third Wave” party systems, I will rely on Mair’s (1996, 2007) framework for party system analysis which, focusing on the patterns of inter-party competition for government, enables to determine whether a party system is or not institutionalized. Putting it briefly, party systems are considered to be institutionalized if (1) alternations of governments are either total or none, (2) governing alternatives are stable over a long period of time, and (3) some parties (“outsiders”) are permanently excluded from participation in national government and weakly institutionalized when there are (1) partial alternations of governments, (2) no stable compositions of governing alternatives and (3) access to government has been granted to all relevant parties.

In order to minimize subjective judgements and opinions in the measurement of the elements of party system institutionalization, I quantitatively operationalize each of the factors suggested by Mair. First of all, and as explained elsewhere (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi, 2010; Casal Bértoa and Mair, forthcoming), the degree of governmental alternation is measured by a so-called index of government alternation (IGA – see Mair 2007:140), which simply adapts Pedersen’s (1979) well-known index of electoral volatility to the measurement of ministerial volatility.¹ The second criterion, based on assessing whether or not the party or combination of parties has governed before in that particular format, is captured by an index of familiar alternation (IFA), which measures the percentage of ministries belonging to familiar combinations of parties. Thirdly, access to government is measured by the index of closure (IC), which basically calculates the percentage of ministers belonging to “old” governing parties.


Because time is particularly important when trying to measure the level of party system institutionalization in a country (Mair, 1997), I also take into consideration all the years a particular cabinet has lasted, understanding that if there have been two or

¹ Ministerial volatility is computed by adding the net change in percentage of “ministers” (including the prime minister), rather than ministries or portfolios, gained and lost by each party in the cabinet from one government to the next, and then dividing by two.

more cabinets in one year, then the averages of the scores for the different above-cited government features are considered to characterize the year better than any of such individual factors (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi, 2010:20). Finally, and in order to avoid measuring incompatible scores, I use the standardized (z-) score of the three variables. The addition of all those three z-scores gives the final degree of system institutionalization in what I have named “composite index of party system institutionalization” (iPSI) which, giving weight to all the elements of stability, has the advantage of paying due attention to it as the sole dimension of institutionalization.

An overview of the level of institutionalization in new European party systems is shown in Figure 1, which ranks the 13 Eastern European democracies² in terms of the stability in the structure of inter-party competition for government during the period 1990-2010. The most evident conclusion derived from these summary data is that party systems in post-communist Europe have institutionalized at different rates and in different ways (Casal Bértoa and Mair, forthcoming). It is to explain why this has been so that I will devote the rest of the paper.

Figure 1. Party system institutionalization in post-communist Eastern Europe



Note: The year of the “founding” elections is in brackets

² All of the countries included in the current study are considered to be democratic (i.e. score of 2 or lower), according to the Freedom House political and civil liberties index in the period here examined. Despite being a democracy since 2009, Montenegro has been excluded from the sample due to the lack of at least one government alternation.

Sources of Party System Institutionalization: a “Comprehensive” Approach

When looking at the current literature on the topic, it is possible to identify up to 17 different factors which, to a different degree and alone or in combination, have been considered vital when trying to explain variation in the degree of party system institutionalization. They are all presented and operationalized below.

Party institutionalization (PI). Few institutional developments have been considered to be more critical for systemic institutionalization than the formation and development of institutionalized political parties (Huntington, 1991; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Rose and Munro, 2003; Toole, 2000; Madrid, 2005; Welfling, 1973). The logic is that as individual political parties institutionalize, they are likely to remain consistent in terms of ideology and interact only with other like-minded parties in a stable way. In other words, since individual political parties constitute integral parts of the party system “the institutionalization of the [latter] directly depends on that of individual parties” (Meleshevich, 2007:16).

Electoral disproportionality (EDISP) and party system concentration (PCON). Ever since the publication of Duverger’s *Political Parties* (1954) electoral systems have been considered to be main causal force behind the number of parties in a system (Lijphart, 1994; Riker, 1982). However, it was not until the publication of Sartori’s work on *Political Parties and Party Systems* (1976) more than twenty years later that the former (“format”) started to be linked with a party system’s “mechanics”. Since then, other authors have also confirmed the importance both party system fragmentation (Birch, 2003; Birnir, 2007; Mainwaring and Zocco, 2007; Remmer, 1991; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Tavits, 2005) and the electoral systems (Birch, 2003; Kostelecký, 2002; Mainwaring, 1999) have for the process of systemic institutionalization in new democracies.

Ideological polarization (POLAR). The majority of scholars, departing from spatial models of voting behavior (Downs, 1957) considered that the greater the degree of ideological distance between political parties (i.e., polarization), the less likely it is that voters will shift their support from one party to the other and, therefore, the higher the degree of systemic institutionalization will be (see Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Madrid, 2005; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Tavits, 2005).

Nature of the State (NoS). In his in-depth study of the Brazilian party system, Mainwaring maintains that federalism has a negative impact on the process of

institutionalization as it fosters “party decentralization and heterogeneity” (1999:263-266). The idea is that because in federal systems many aspects of national politics are played at federal/regional or local level, the structure of partisan competition will be necessarily affected making it less predictable. A phenomenon that never takes place in centralized states.

Type of Regime (PARL). In contrast to parliamentary presidents, which tend to be elected either as the fruit of a compromise between the totality/majority of political parties or by a qualified majority which forcefully requires the support of the major parliamentary parties,³ presidential candidates cannot afford to ignore any more or less significant segment of the population. As a result, broad coalitions which may cut across ideological lines are likely to be formed, the main implication being that, as a reward for their support in elections, “one or more of them can plausibly claim to represent the decisive electoral bloc in a close contest and may make demands accordingly” (Linz, 1990:58), namely: participation in government, future electoral cooperation, etc (Casal Bértoa, 2011).

Party Funding (PFUND). The first scholar to (indirectly) suggest that party funding may foster the process of party system institutionalization was Huntington (1968) for whom “certain forms of corruption (e.g. illegal donations) can strengthen a parliamentary party and in turn this institutionalized party can develop rules [... party campaign finance laws ...] to protect the integrity of the political process from weaker parties” (Roper, 2002:179). More recently, Birnir (2005) and Spirova (2007) have arrived to a similar conclusion for Eastern European countries.

Ethno-religious Concentration (ERCON). According to these Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) classical “hypothesis”, party systems *freeze* because “individuals develop attachments to parties on the basis of their social locations – their religion, class, residence (urban or rural) and culture (core versus minority culture)” (Mainwaring and Zocco, 2007:163; see also Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Birnir, 2007; Madrid, 2005).

Cleavage cumulation (CCUM). More recently, Casal Bértoa (forthcoming) suggested that institutionalization will occur in those party systems with a cumulative-coinciding cleavage structure, as political parties and voters will be structured by those coinciding line(s) of division into two clearly defined alternative blocs, making the structure of partisan competition stable and predictable over time. On the contrary, in systems where

³ Parliamentary parties tend to see this “almost compulsory” collaboration as strictly occasional.

cleavages have a cross-cutting character, institutionalization will suffer as parties will have to cooperate across dividing ideological lines, which will convert any possible alliance in *ad hoc*, ephemeral and unpredictable.

Political Culture (PCUL). Even if the notion first appeared in Almond's seminal *Comparative Political Systems* (1956), it was not until Mainwaring path-breaking study of the process of party system institutionalization in Brazil that a nation's "anti-organizational political culture" was considered to have a negative influence on the former (1999:233-234). More recently, Johnson found Indonesia's political culture to be a "non-permanent barrier", but an obstacle in any case, for the process of systemic institutionalization recently inaugurated (2002:720-728).

Historical legacies (LEGAC). According to Kitschelt, either alone (1995, 2001) or with his colleagues (1999),

[c]ritical junctures surrounding state building and timing of the entry of the masses into politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries determined the pattern of interwar politics, which shaped the structure of Communist authority, which in turn [coupled with a distinct mode of transition] determined the pattern of party structuration in the postcommunist period (Kopstein, 2003:239)

The argument holds that earlier the economic industrialization, state formation and democratization before communism, as well as the milder the type of communist rule, the more institutionalized the structure of inter-party competition will be.

Economic development (WEALTH). The level of economic development has long been seen to shape the process of party system institutionalization in new democracies, either in Latin America (Remmer, 1991; Madrid, 2005; Mainwaring, 1999; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999), Eastern Europe (Tavits, 2005) or East Asia (Johnson, 2002). In particular, economic hardship is hypothesized to lead to party system instability as parties move away from incumbents, held responsible for the course of the economy, and try to find new political alternative, either in the traditional opposition or at the fringes of the political spectrum (Duch, 2002; Fidrmuc, 2000; Pacek, 1994; Tucker, 2002, 2006). In this sense, negative economic performance is expected to undermine "existing party loyalties, or, more relevant in the case of young democracies, prevent[...] these loyalties from emerging" (Tavits, 2005:286-287; Mainwaring and Zocco, 2007).

Previous democracy (PDEM). According to Remmer (1985), the older the party system is previous to the imposition of authoritarianism in a country, the more the stability will be observed at the time of re-democratization (see also Rivera, 1996:180). The logic is that if during the pre-authoritarian period political parties had the opportunity to take roots in society and enough time to establish a minimal level of interaction/cooperation, definitively affecting the perception voters have about their ideological stances and political preferences, the chances that both political parties and voters behave in a predictable and stable way in the post-authoritarian period will be higher (Kitschelt, 1995: 452; Pasquino, 1990:46-7).

Length of authoritarian rule (YoA). Building on Remmer's findings, Hamman and Sgouraski-Kinsey, maintained that "the longer the interruption of competitive party politics, the less the expected party system continuity", understood as "stability in structural features of the party system". In particular, it is considered that "the shorter the interruption, the more fixed the reputations of political parties for specific policy positions" (1999: 56, 70) and, therefore, the higher the continuity/predictability of the patterns of partisan interaction will be (see also Bennett, 1998:190-191; or Pasquino, 1990:44-45).

Time of transition (ToT). Because democracies that were founded in an earlier period "had stronger party organizations, and voters [...] stronger attachment to parties," party system institutionalization will be higher in all those countries which experienced an earlier the transition to democracy (Mainwaring, 2007:163; see also Casal Bértoa and Mair, forthcoming).

Democratic experience (YoD). Because party system institutionalization is considered to be a lengthy process (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Converse, 1969; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 1997; Spirova, 2007: 161-162; Tavits, 2005:296), stable patterns of party competition are considered to start emerging only after democratic government has been in place for some time. However, the stance regarding this point within the literature is everything but unanimous (see Bielasiak, 2002; Mainwaring and Zocco, 2007; Rose and Munro, 2003).

EU conditionality (EUCON). According to Vachudová, either alone (2008) or with Hooghes (2009), EU integration has led to higher systemic institutionalization due to a shift from cultural to economic dimensions of partisan competition. In fact, in post-communist Europe party system instability increased as soon as EU conditionality diminished. More recently, Ladrech has maintained that "the continuing low degree of

psi [i.e. party system institutionalization] in most post-communist party systems is *partly* explained by constraints on the development of stable linkages between party (policies) and voter (preferences)”, due to the re-positioning of political parties before and after accession (2010).

“Relevant” Factors (What?): MDSO/MSDO

As we have already seen, comparative political theory offers different possible (co-)explanations for the distinct levels of party system institutionalization observed in new and old democracies. In this paper, where the number of possible combinations of conditions⁴ ($2^{14}=16384$) clearly dwarfs the number of cases available for analysis (13), I will make use of De Meur and Berg-Schlosser’s (1994) MDSO/MSDO procedure, a technique particularly well suited as a prior step before using QCA and, on the whole, extremely useful for systemic analyses which, like this one, present the so-called “limited diversity” problem⁵ (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009). Thereby, the idea is that by carefully matching all the cases under study across the different (potential) explanatory factors found in the institutionalization literature, using a step-wise elaboration of distance matrices and (dis)similarity graphs, I can identify the most similar pairs of cases with a different outcome as well as the most different pairs of cases displaying a similar outcome (Rihoux, 2006:688). This will allow me to reduce the number of possible explanatory variables to the minimum and, therefore, be able to achieve a less complex comparison which, without any preconceived idea, focuses on those *relevant* factors that might account for the differences degrees of systemic institutionalization observed (De Meur and Gottcheiner, 2009:215).

Bearing in mind that we have 14 possible explanatory factors, and following the logic of the MDSO-MSDO procedure (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 1994; De Meur and Gottcheiner, 2009; De Meur *et al.*, 2006), I have clustered the different variables into three rather homogeneous categories: namely, socio-economic (A), historic-structural (B), and systemic-institutional (C). Secondly, all variables needed to be

⁴ Due to the lack of variation, both NoS and ToT have been excluded from the analysis. In a similar vein, YoA is left out of the study as it overlaps with PD when dichotomized.

⁵ Limited diversity occurs when no real cases matching all logically possible combinations of the selected conditions can be found (Grofman and Schneider, 2009:3). It is in the name of parsimony and in order to avoid a simple description of cases - with one individual explanation per case - that a solution to this problem needs to be found before proceeding with any QCA-type analysis (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009:27).

dichotomized (Table A, Appendix I). The result is a data matrix (Table B, Appendix I) featuring our thirteen cases, of which 7 are positive (institutionalized) and 6 negative (non-institutionalized), and 14 Boolean conditions meaning: presence (1) or absence (0).

Once those operations have taken place and before proceeding with any further comparison, it is essential to identify which pairs of cases are the most similar and which the most dissimilar. In order to do so, it is necessary to build and synthesise distance matrices within and across categories (Table C, Appendix I) (De Meur *et al.*, 2006:75). This will definitively help us to select which cases share the smallest number of same-valued variables and identical outcome (MDSO pairs) and the smallest number of different-valued variables and different outcome (MSDO pairs) (see figure A for (dis)similarity graphs).

On the basis of the data in table C and figure A (both in Appendix I), I then proceed to compare,⁶ within the most dissimilar institutionalized party systems, Romania against the Czech Republic. Out of the initial 14 variables, only PCON and PFUND present the same value. Adding Slovenia (with the second highest integer) to the comparison reduces the number of relevant variables to just one: namely, PFUND. A second comparison between Hungary and Ukraine yields two variables: CCUM and, again, PCON. Both variables remain relevant when adding the Czech Republic. A third comparison between Hungary, Ukraine and Slovakia does not change anything to the selection of relevant variables. Among the most dissimilar non-institutionalized party systems, comparing Latvia with Bulgaria yields four variables: WEALTH, EUCON, PI and PFUND. The inclusion of Serbia in the comparison allows me to exclude the last two.

Among the MSDO cases, the case pattern contains two countries: Serbia and Romania. ERCON and PCON are the only same-valued variables. Although merely the latter keeps its relevancy once Ukraine is added to the comparison. Considering the pair Serbia/Romania against Bulgaria adds nothing to the analysis.

All in all, and once the MSDO-MDSO procedure is completed, just five variables can be deemed relevant: namely, parliamentary concentration, cleavage cumulation, party funding, wealth, and EU conditionality. This is not to say, however, that all of them will be included in the forthcoming QCA analysis. In particular, and

⁶ The complete set of pairwise or three by three comparisons can be seen in Appendix II at the end of the paper.

after going back to the cases and looking at other comparisons made at a lower level of (dis)similarity (mainly pairwise), the inclusion of “EU conditionality” seems controversial for the following reasons:

1) Notwithstanding the correlation (-0.363) between the number of kilometres from a country’s capital and Brussels and the number of years as EU member,⁷ the fact that some countries like Croatia or Serbia - closer to Brussels than, for instance, Latvia or Poland – are not yet EU member puts some doubts on the way such variable has been dichotomized. Not to question the fact that such operationalization may not capture “EU conditionality” at all.

2) The previous idea is confirmed when examining again the comparison which yields EUCON as a relevant variable. There it is possible to observe how dichotomization has made equal three countries where the effect of EU conditionality has had different degrees: Latvia (member since 2004), Bulgaria (member since 2007) and Serbia (not even a candidate).

3) Moreover, and contrary to the other four “relevant” variables, out of 14 pairwise comparisons “EU conditionality” is deemed relevant in just two cases: namely, Hungary and Slovakia, Serbia and Slovenia (with the problem above-cited).⁸

4) The exclusion of EUCON from the sample of relevant conditions does not alter the truth table with the appearance of contradictory causal configurations, something that happens when any of the other variables is removed.

5) Neither EUCON nor its absence can be considered to be a necessary condition for the (non-)institutionalization of post-communist party systems (consistency \leq 0.85).

For all these reasons, and in search for parsimony, I have decided to exclude “EU conditionality” from my analytical model of a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (see the table 1).

⁷ There is no correlation, however, between the number of kilometers from a country’s capital and Brussels and a country’s EU membership ($r = -.139$).

⁸ In clear contrast, PCON appears 8 times, WEALTH 7, CCUM 6, and PFUND 5.

Table 1. Truth table of “Party System Institutionalization” and Four Conditions

Row #	Causal Conditions				Outcome	Country
	PCON	WEALTH	CUM	PFUND	PSI	
# 1	1	0	0	0	0	Bulgaria
# 2	1	1	1	1	1	Croatia/Czech R./Hungary
# 3	0	0	0	0	0	Estonia/Lithuania
# 4	0	0	1	0	0	Latvia
# 5	0	0	0	1	0	Poland/Serbia
# 6	1	0	0	1	1	Romania
# 7	0	1	0	1	1	Slovakia
# 8	0	1	1	1	1	Slovenia
# 9	1	0	1	0	1	Ukraine
# 10... # 16					R	

Note: R = “Logical remainder”

Causal Combinations (How?): csQCA

The “contradictions-free” truth table above shows that 13 cases are covered by 9 different configurations. A first step in any QCA analysis is to look for either necessity or sufficient conditions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010:8-9). Interestingly enough, among the conditions under study wealth reveals to be a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for party system institutionalization, while its absence needs to be considered as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the lack of systemic institutionalization (see table D in the appendix).⁹ This, as we will have the opportunity to see, will have important implications in my analyses.

Thus, and bearing in mind that party systems in rich countries will always institutionalize,¹⁰ the following solution formula¹¹ is obtained:

$$PSI = WEALTH + PCON * \left\{ \begin{array}{l} CCUM \text{ (Ukraine)} \\ PFUND \text{ (Romania)} \end{array} \right.$$

(Slk/Slv)
(Hun/Cro/Cze)

⁹ In order to be considered as a necessary condition, the consistency score should be 1. In the same vein, for a condition to be sufficient, the coverage score should be also 1.

¹⁰ This allows for the inclusion of the following simplifying assumptions from scratch:

ccum*pccon*pfund*WEALTH+
ccum*PCON*pfund*WEALTH+
ccum*PCON*PFUND*WEALTH+
CCUM*pccon*pfund*WEALTH+
CCUM*PCON*pfund*WEALTH.

¹¹ In QCA the presence of a condition is represented by capital letters while its absence is described with lower cases. Moreover, the following logical operators are used: an asterisk (*) is used to indicate the logical “AND” (i.e. a combination of conditions), while a plus sign (+) is used to indicate the logical “OR” (i.e. coexistence of equivalent conditions with the same outcome) (Ragin, 1987: 85-102).

According to such formula, party systems will always be institutionalized in rich countries and in poor countries provided that, together with a low number of parliamentary parties, they make available public funding for political parties or cleavages structure in a cumulative way.

On the contrary, and taking into consideration that wealth is a sufficient condition for the outcome,¹² the analysis arrives to the following minimal formula:

$$\text{psi} = \text{wealth} * \begin{cases} \text{ccum} * \text{pfund} \text{ (Bul)} \\ \text{parlcon} \text{ (Ser/Pol/Lat)} \end{cases}$$

(Est/Lit)

Thus, the institutionalization of party systems will not take place in poor countries with either a huge number of parliamentary parties or, lacking party funding, present a cross-cutting cleavage structure.

Causal Mechanisms (Why?): Process-tracing

In order to know how the previously mentioned combinations of factors affect the process of party system institutionalization, I will complement the previous analyses with a procedure particularly suitable to make out “the intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable [...] and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005:296). The idea is that, by breaking down the rather large process of systemic institutionalization into its constituent mechanisms, I can more easily identify the “causal mechanisms” leading from the presence (or the absence) of wealth and/or parliamentary concentration and/or cleavage cumulation and/or party funding to party system (non-)institutionalization. With such aim in mind, and using “process-tracing”, I will next proceed to examine the “causal mechanisms” linking the abovementioned variables in two paradigmatic cases: namely, Hungary and Lithuania.

The fact that economic development is one of the most important determinants of party system institutionalization in post-communist Europe does not come as a surprise. In Hungary, together with the Czech Republic the most economically

¹² For the reasons above-cited, the simplifying assumptions mentioned in footnote 10 are included in the analysis.

developed regime within the communist bloc, economic issues took a secondary (even tertiary) role from the very beginning. In this sense, and because they were almost solved from the very beginning, economy did not play the central role in the political debate as it did in Lithuania. There, bad economic performance has remained one of the main reasons for cabinet turnover and party system instability from the beginning. Indeed, when we look at the state of the economy in Lithuania at the moment of each parliamentary election (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008) we can see a clear negative relationship. In Hungary, on the contrary, and with the exception of the last legislative elections, each government alternation was preceded by a period of economic growth and development.

Because the format of a party system contains a “statement of mechanical tendencies [predispositions]” (Sartori, 1976:173 [128]), and therefore a gauge of the likely tactics of partisan competition and opposition as well as government formation possibilities in a country (1976:120), parliamentary fragmentation, as it results from the previous analysis, needs to be considered one of the most important sources of systemic institutionalization. The logic is that by indicating the numbers (and strength) of “streams of interaction” (Sjöblom, 1968:174), the number (and size) of parties winning seats in legislative elections, clearly affects the ease with which parties interact and governments can be formed. In other words, “the greater the number of parties (that have a say), the greater the complexity and probably the intricacy of the [interactions will be]” (Sartori, 1976:120).

More concretely, while in highly concentrated party systems (i.e. two- and limited pluralist, $ENPP \leq 4$), governments tend to be single-party, in legislatively fragmented systems (i.e. extreme-pluralist, $ENPP > 4$), where no party controls close to a majority of seats and the need for large inter-party coalitions increases, the probability that cabinets contain parties from the immediately previous government will be higher. As a result, while in Hungary government alternation has been wholesale (with one exception), in Lithuania, with the inauguration of extreme-pluralism after the 2000 “earthquake” parliamentary elections, it has always had a partial character.


Secondly, because the number of parties in parliament shapes the menu of choices which parties and their leaders face when interacting, it seems very logical to think that the higher the legislative fragmentation, the greater the “interaction streams” and, therefore, the number of relevant party relations that must be observed and considered in the process of inter-party competition (for government). In other words,

because 3 parties allow for 7 possible combinations, 4 for 10, 5 for 25, and so on (Sartori, 1976; Sjöblom, 1968), the higher the number of “effective” parliamentary parties, the higher the level of innovation the process of government formation will be. Thus, while in Hungary the structure of competition became familiar rather quickly (May 1994) with the formation of two antagonist blocs (socialists vs. conservatives); in Lithuania the number of possible governing formulae has been greater: namely, socialists alone (1993-1996), conservatives/Christian-democrats and social-liberals (1996-2000), socialists and social-liberals (2001-2004), socialists/populist/social-liberals and agrarians (2004-2006), socialists/social-liberals/liberal-conservatives and agrarians (2006-2008) and, finally, from 2009 conservatives/populists and liberals (both conservative and social (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011:127-128).

Third, and perhaps more straightforward, because access to government remains open as long as certain parties keep their chances to join the executive, the probability that new parties enjoy the spoils of office is higher in legislatively fragmented party systems than in parliamentary concentrated ones. Indeed, because closing access to parliament equals closing access to government (Toole, 2000:456), low parliamentary fragmentation fosters the stabilization of the structure of partisan competition. The Hungarian party systems, where no new parties have had the opportunity to enjoy the spoils of office since May 1998, clearly illustrate the previous point. On the contrary, in extreme-pluralist Lithuania, access to executive office has remained extremely open with new parties being able to form part of the executive in every single cabinet.

Figure 2, which displays the scores of parliamentary fragmentation and party system institutionalization at the end of each electoral period, shows the almost perfect relationship between the above-cited two variables. Hence, while in Hungary almost every decline in the “effective” number of legislative parties has been followed by an increase in the level of systemic institutionalization, the originally stronger Lithuanian party system has suffered from a continuous and parallel process of fragmentation and de-institutionalization. Moreover, and apart from this pronounced inter-country variation, another striking pattern revealed by these data is one that is also intuitively plausible: parliamentary fragmentation and party system institutionalization raise and fall accordingly, so when the former decreases the latter increases, and *vice versa*. In this sense, and most interesting, they fluctuate not only in the same direction but also to a similar extent, confirming previous expectations on the strength of the relationship between these two variables.

Figure 2. Parliamentary fragmentation and party system institutionalization in Hungary and Lithuania*



* Note: For comparative reasons, parliamentary fragmentation has been measured according to Rae's (1967) index: $F_s = 1 - \sum s_i$, where s_i is the proportion of seats of the i th party

All in all, and because the number of parties has “mechanical predispositions”, in the sense that it gives us information on certain functional properties (e.g. interaction streams, coalition potential, etc.), the relationship between party system format and institutionalization can be said to be “path-dependence” as it seems to respond to the following pattern: the lower the parliamentary concentration, the higher the number of “interaction paths” and, hence, the greater the complexity of the patterns of cooperation and collaboration (Groennings *et al.*, 1970:457). In other words, when party leaders must follow manoeuvres among a large number of parties, predictability and stability in the structure of inter-party competition is obviously hindered.

Similarly, party funding has also contributed to the institutionalization of post-communist party systems as it has eased the continuity of existing political options while, at the same time, reducing “the impact of those seeking to challenge the political status quo” (Scarow, 2006:629). In other words, by discouraging the entry of new parties to the system and, therefore, keeping the number of (both electoral and parliamentary) parties rather low, public funded party systems have been able to guarantee the supremacy of already existing parties (Katz and Mair, 1995:15) and, consequently, assure the stability and predictability of the structure of competition among them.

Table 2. Consequences of party funding for party system institutionalization in Hungary and Lithuania

Country	Period (n. of elections)	Number of new parties*	Total number of parties	Number of winning parties	Small Party Vote Share
<i>Hungary</i>	1990-2010 (6)	2	9.2	5.3	9.7
<i>Lithuania</i>	1992-2010 (5)	5	14.8	10.4	20.4
	1992-1999 (2)	9	16.5	11.5	24.4
	2000-2010 (3)	3.7	13.7	9.7	17.7

* Mergers and electoral coalitions excluded.

Following Scarrow (2006), table 2 compares the two party systems at hand on the basis of four different indicators: namely, the number of new parties entering the system, the number of parties winning at least 0.5 per cent of the vote, the “raw” number of parties winning legislative seats and, finally, the share of parties winning less than 5 per cent of the vote. No matter at which indicator we look, it seems clear that “the model of Hungarian party funding [has...] help[ed...] to consolidate the party system” (Enyedi, 2007: 102). That this is the case derives also from the fact that after the introduction of public subsidies for political parties in 1999, the Lithuanian party system clearly improved although not to the same levels as its Hungarian counterpart. Moreover, and what is more valid for our study, while the Hungarian model of public funding introduced from the very beginning a clear discrimination between publicly and non-publicly funded parties, guaranteeing the concentration of the party systems among a reduced number of political options; in Lithuania such “reductive” effect only started to take place after 1999.¹³ Thus, while in Hungary none of parties deprived of public funding managed to survive more than one election, in Lithuania up to the year 2000 (inclusive) a total of 62% (average) of the parties winning 3% of the vote¹⁴ managed to postulate candidates in the next election. As expected, such percentage was cut in half (i.e. 35.4) after public subsidies were introduced. In this context, a process of party system concentration was initiated among those parties deprived of public funds with the only aim of survival. Thus, before the 2004 elections LCS merged with LLS in order to form the LiCS, and LPKTS merged with TS-LK. In the similar vein, KKSS and JL formed an electoral alliance. Unable to cross the payout threshold in 2004, both LTS and KDS merged with TS in 2008.

But together with a country’s economy and institutions, sociological factors have also played an important role. In particular, the cumulative character of Hungarian

¹³ As both countries used the same type of mixed electoral system, a possible effect of the latter on either the number of parties or on the patterns of inter-party competition is totally excluded.

¹⁴ Payout threshold introduced only in 1999.

cleavages (see figure 3) has enabled a division of the political spectrum into two very antagonistic (and stable) political camps: “a socially conservative, religious, somewhat nationalist, and anti-communist camp [...] and [...] a secular, morally permissive and generally less nationalist camp” (Tóka, 2004:322; see also Enyedi, 2006). The result has been a very well institutionalized party system in which the structure of inter-party competition has pitted again and again the political forces of the cosmopolitan, post-communist and anti-clerical “left” (mainly MSZP and SZDSZ) against the nationalist, anti-communist and clerical “right” (basically Fidesz/KDNP, MDF and FKgP).

In sum, it has not been by chance that the patterns of partisan competition started to be characterized by total government alternations, familiar governing formulae, and closed access after 1998 but thanks to the consolidation of the abovementioned (cumulative) cleavage structure, which should be simply seen “as a natural adaptation, in the absence of deep cleavages cross-cutting each other” (Enyedi and Tóka, 2007:150).

Figure 3. Political parties and cleavages structuration in Hungary and Poland
Secular (Hungary)/Rural (Lithuania)

	VNDPS SZDSZ MSZP	LKDS LKD	
Post-commun. (Hungary)		LDP	Anti-commun. (Hungary)
Statist (Lithuania)	LSdP		
		NS/SL TS Fidesz FKgP MIÉP MDF LCS	Liberal (Lithuania)
		Religious (Hungary)/Urban (Lithuania)	

* Political Parties in Hungary (in italics): Fidesz= Federation of Young Democrats; FKgP = Independent Party of Smallholders; MDF = Hungarian Democratic Forum; MIÉP = Hungarian Justice and Life Party; MSZP = Hungarian Socialist Party; MSZDP = Social Democratic Party of Hungary; SZDSZ = Alliance of Free Democrats. Political parties in Lithuania: LCS = Lithuanian and Centre Union; LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; LKD = Lithuanian Christian Democrats; LKDP = Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party; LSdP = Lithuanian Social Democratic Party; NS/SL = New Union-Social Liberals; TS = Homeland Union; VNDPS = Union of Peasants' and New Democracy Parties

Source: Benoit & Laver (2006)

In contrast to Hungary, the Lithuanian party system has been characterized since the very beginning by a multi-dimensional space of inter-party competition, revolving around two different types cleavages: economic and urban/rural (Duvold and Jurkynas, 2004). Indeed, and as it is shown in figure 3, the rural/urban division cuts across the economic cleavage dividing the Lithuanian political spectrum in four different politico-ideological fields:

- a) Socialist (strong support of state interventionism and a cosmopolitanism),
- b) Agrarian (support for state interventionism combined with traditionalism),
- c) Conservative (combination of pro-market attitudes and traditionalism, usually in a Christian-democratic version)
- d) Liberal (strong support of free-market/enterprise and modern values).

Bearing in mind all that has been said, it is clear to observe how the social protectionist camp¹⁵ (socialists + agrarians) differs from the pro-market camp (conservatives + liberals) in terms of economy, while the urban camp (socialists + liberals) from the rural camp (agrarians + conservatives) in terms of cosmopolitanism. Consequently, parties have had it very difficult to establish stable patterns of governmental and/or electoral cooperation. In fact, in almost twenty years of democratic politics only the first (mono-color) Lithuanian government managed to unite all parties from the same political field.

In sum, the main conclusion following from the previous analysis is that the level of systemic institutionalization in a country will depend on the mode socio-political cleavages structure. Thus, in party systems where cleavages have a cumulative-coinciding character, like in Hungary, political parties will tend to interact only with other parties within the same side of the cleavage(s) while rejecting at the same time any cooperation that would lead them to cross such line. This will definitively simplify the structure of inter-party competition (into two different and separate blocs), making it more stable and predictable over time. On the contrary, in systems where cleavages are cross-cutting, parties will have it very difficult to find ideologically contiguous partners with which to cooperate, as being close in one dimension may be accompanied by irreconcilable differences in another. Being forced to interact in multiplicity of non-coinciding directions will definitively diminish the ability of parties to adapt to the *cross* pressures, converting any possible pattern of interaction in *ad hoc*, ephemeral and unpredictable. Bearing in mind such an ideologically heterogeneous and dogmatically complex political panorama, it is hardly surprising that the Lithuanian party system has remained weakly institutionalized.

Conclusion

Since Mainwaring and Scully (1995) trumpeted the important consequences party system institutionalization may have for the consolidation of democracy in post-transitional countries, much has been written about the level of institutionalization in new party systems. Yet the question of the causes of systemic institutionalization has remained, to say the least, controversial.

¹⁵ In contrast to the word “field”, I use the notion of “camp” to indicate the sum of two fields (either on the basis of economy or religion). As a result, camp has a stronger connotation than field.

In order to begin to solve this question, and making use of three different methodological techniques (MDSO/MSDO, csQCA and process-tracing), this paper tries to give answer to the following questions: thanks to *what*, *how*, and *why* some post-communist party systems institutionalized while others have not. These are the main conclusions.

First of all, out of the seventeen competing explanations found in the literature only four can be conceived as having some “explanatory” power: namely, parliamentary concentration (i.e. low number of legislative parties), cleavage cumulation, party funding, and economic development. Among these, the latter is to be considered the most important as its only presence is *sufficient* for the institutionalization of a party system to take place. This is not to say, however, that economically backward party systems cannot institutionalize, as the examples of Romania and Ukraine, show. For that, the number of parties in parliament should never be higher than four, provided that they also make public funding available *or* cleavages related in a cumulative, rather than cross-cutting, manner. On the contrary, party systems will not be able to institutionalize in poor countries with extreme-pluralist party systems, or in economically underdeveloped nations where cleavages are cross-cutting and party funding is not envisaged.

More importantly, my study builds a bridge, on the one hand, between those scholars emphasizing sociological or institutional dependence as my findings show complementarity (e.g. PCON*CCUM or ccum*pfund) rather than conflict between those two explanatory approaches. On the other hand, and similar to what happens with the process of democratic consolidation (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997), this paper suggests, without being deterministic, that once a certain threshold of wealth is crossed party systems will remained institutionalized (no matter what). At the end of the day, I can conclude saying that systemic institutionalization has not only been a question of money...but mostly.

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APPENDIX I

Table A. Definition of variables (Boolean/dichotomized version)

Variable/Condition	Indicator (Threshold)	Sources
<i>Outcome</i>		
<i>PSI</i>	Composite index of Party System Institutionalization (0)	Casal Bértoa & Mair (forthcoming)
<i>Category A: Socio-economic</i>		
<i>WEALTH</i>	Mean annual GDP <i>per capita</i> for the period under studied, but lagged. (12000)	World Bank (2010)
<i>ERCON</i>	Average of the CIFP global rank based index scores for ethnic and religious diversity (49)	Skaaning (2005)
<i>CCUM</i>	Line of linear fit (R^2) between the two most salient cleavages in a particular country (50)	Casal Bértoa (forthcoming) ¹⁶
<i>PCUL</i>	“Survival/self-expression values” scores (-0,7)	Inglehart and Welzel (2005) ¹⁷
<i>Category B: Historic-structural</i>		
<i>LEGAC</i>	Early development scores (29)	Kitschelt (2001:7: 46-47)
<i>PDEM</i>	Yes (1)/No (0)	Rivera (1996:182)
<i>YoD</i>	Years since the (re-)inauguration of democracy (15)	Müller-Rommel <i>et al.</i> (2004:871)
<i>EUCON</i>	Distance of a post-communist country’s capital from Brussels ¹⁸ (12777)	www.europa.eu
<i>Category C: Systemic Institutional</i>		
<i>PI</i>	Average age of the (currently existing) political parties receiving at least 10% of the vote in any legislative election (16)	Dix (1992)
<i>EDISP</i>	Least-square index (7)	Gallagher’s (1991)
<i>PCON</i>	“Effective” number of legislative parties (4,1)	Mainwaring and Scully (1995)
<i>POL</i>	Distance between the leftmost and rightmost party in a system (10)	Abedi (2002:556) ¹⁹
<i>PARL</i>	Parliamentarism (1)/Semi-presidentialism (0)	Elgie (2008)
<i>PFUND</i>	Party funding...in 2/3 of the elections (1)/...in less (0)	Birnir (2005)

¹⁶ I order to calculate cleavage cumulation I use the data provided by Benoit and Laver (2006) on the position of parties according to different (political) cleavages.

¹⁷ In particular, I use for each country the score given by the wave of the *World Value Survey* closer to the moment of the inauguration of democracy.

¹⁸ The correlation between the distance of a post-communist country capital to Brussels and the number of years in the EU is of -0.363, meaning that the higher the remoteness the lower the EUCON.

¹⁹ I order to calculate ideological polarization I use the data provided by Benoit and Laver (2006) on the position of parties within the left-right spectrum.

Table B. Raw Data and Crisp-set Memberships (i.e. boolean scores) in the Outcome and Conditions

	Hun	Slv	Cze	Rom	Slk	Ukr	Cro	Bul	Ser	Est	Lit	Lat	Pol
<i>Outcome</i>													
<i>PSI</i>	3,5 (1)	2,5 (1)	1,4 (1)	0,9 (1)	0,7 (1)	0,4 (1)	0,2 (1)	-0,5 (0)	-0,6 (0)	-0,7 (0)	-1,5 (0)	-2,4 (0)	-3,9 (0)
<i>Category A</i>													
<i>WEALTH</i>	12904 (1)	12947 (1)	16929 (1)	8545 (0)	13062 (1)	6718 (0)	15418 (1)	7660 (0)	9949 (0)	11906 (0)	10819 (0)	11398 (0)	10884 (0)
<i>ERCON</i>	43,8 (0)	43,8 (0)	31,3 (0)	50 (1)	37,5 (0)	43,8 (0)	50 (1)	62,5 (1)	25 (0)	43,8 (0)	75 (1)	12,5 (0)	87,5 (1)
<i>CCUM</i>	0,8 (1)	0,83 (1)	0,89 (1)	0,15 (0)	0,02 (0)	0,57 (1)	0,89 (1)	0,35 (0)	0,29 (0)	0,02 (0)	0,43 (0)	0,67 (1)	0,03 (0)
<i>PCUL</i>	-1,1 (0)	-0,6 (1)	-0,1 (1)	-1,3 (0)	-0,8 (0)	-0,8 (0)	0,3 (1)	-1,3 (0)	-1 (0)	-0,9 (0)	-0,6 (1)	-0,6 (1)	-0,3 (1)
<i>Category B</i>													
<i>LEGAC</i>	30 (1)	30 (1)	40 (1)	20 (0)	25 (0)	20 (0)	25 (0)	20 (0)	20 (0)	30 (1)	30 (1)	30 (1)	30 (1)
<i>PDEM</i>	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
<i>YoD</i>	21 (1)	20 (1)	21 (1)	15 (0)	21 (1)	6 (0)	11 (0)	21 (1)	9 (0)	20 (1)	20 (1)	20 (1)	20 (1)
<i>EUCON</i>	1148 (1)	897 (1)	715 (1)	1782 (0)	969 (1)	1839 (0)	1012 (1)	1702 (0)	1377 (0)	1608 (0)	1480 (0)	1465 (0)	1178 (1)
<i>Category C</i>													
<i>PI</i>	19,5 (1)	19 (1)	14,7 (0)	17,4 (1)	13,4 (0)	10,3 (0)	20,8 (1)	14,8 (0)	16,5 (1)	15 (0)	9,2 (0)	15,1 (0)	15,2 (0)
<i>EDISP</i>	11 (1)	3,8 (0)	6,7 (0)	5,5 (0)	6,7 (0)	6,1 (0)	7,6 (1)	7,2 (1)	4,2 (0)	5,2 (0)	10,3 (1)	5 (0)	8,3 (1)
<i>PCON</i>	2,8 (1)	5,2 (0)	4 (1)	3,7 (1)	4,6 (0)	3,4 (1)	3,6 (1)	3,1 (1)	4,3 (0)	4,9 (0)	4,4 (0)	5,5 (0)	4,8 (0)
<i>POL</i>	8,1 (0)	9,9 (0)	12,9 (1)	7,5 (0)	10,6 (1)	13,3 (1)	13,2 (1)	9,6 (0)	10 (0)	6,7 (0)	9 (0)	14,7 (1)	9,4 (0)
<i>PARL</i>	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
<i>PFUND</i>	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1

Table C. Distance matrix

	HUN	SLV	CZE	ROM	SLK	UKR	CRO	bul	ser	est	lit	Lat
SLV	-----											
CZE	-----	-1111										
ROM	-2222	12222	22222									
SLK	11111	-----	-----	-1111								
UKR	12222	-2222	11111	-----	-1111							
CRO	-----	-----	-1111	-1111	-1111	-1111						
Bul	-----	-----	-----	12222	-----	-1222	-----					
Ser	-----	11111	-----	13333	-1222	12222	-1111	11111				
Est	-----	-----	-1111	-1111	-1111	-1111	-----	-----	-1111			
Lit	-1111	-1111	-----	-1111	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----		
Lat	-----	-1111	-2333	-----	--111	-1222	-1111	22222	12222	-----	-----	
Pol	-1111	-1222	11111	-1111	-1222	-----	-----	-1111	11111	-----	-----	11111

Notes: Zone 1 (blue) = MDSO (+); Zone 2 (purple) = MDSO (-); Zone 3(yellow) = MSDO.

Figure A. Most relevant pairs






Table D. Results of the necessity analysis for the occurrence/absence of the outcome

Causal Condition	Presence of the Outcome (PSI)		Absence of the Outcome (psi)	
	Consistency	Coverage		Consistency
Pcon	0.71	0.83	0.83	0.71
Wealth	0.71	1	1	0.75
Ccum	0.71	0.83	0.83	0.71
Pfund	0.86	0.75	0.67	0.8

Source: Table compiled on the basis of the results obtained with fsQCA 2.0

APPENDIX II

MDSO (+)

	ROM	CZE		SLV
PSI	1	1		1
WEALTH	0	1		1
ERCON	1	0		0
CCUM	0	1		1
PCUL	0	1		1
LEGAC	0	1		1
PDEM	0	1		0
YoD	0	1		1
EUCON	0	1		1
PI	1	0		1
EDISP	0	0		0
PCON	1	1		0
POL	1	0		1

	UKR	HUN		Cze
PSI	1	1		1
WEALTH	0	1		1
ERCON	0	0		0
CCUM	1	1		1
PCUL	0	0		1
LEGAC	0	1		1
PDEM	0	0		1
YoD	0	1		1
EUCON	0	1		1
PI	0	1		0
EDISP	0	1		0
PCON	1	1		1
POL	0	1		0
PARL	0	1		1

PARL	0	1		0
PFUND	1	1		1

MDSO (-)

	LAT	BUL		SER
PSI	0	0		0
<i>WEALTH</i>	0	0		0
<i>ERCON</i>	0	1		0
<i>CCUM</i>	1	0		0
<i>PCUL</i>	1	0		0
<i>LEGAC</i>	1	0		0
<i>PDEM</i>	1	0		0
<i>YoD</i>	1	1		0
<i>EUCON</i>	0	0		0
<i>PI</i>	0	0		1
<i>EDISP</i>	0	1		0
<i>PCON</i>	0	1		0
<i>POL</i>	0	1		1
<i>PARL</i>	1	0		0
<i>PFUND</i>	0	0		1

MSDO

	SER	ROM		UKR
PSI	0	1		1
<i>WEALTH</i>	0	0		0
<i>ERCON</i>	0	1		0
<i>CCUM</i>	0	0		1
<i>PCUL</i>	0	0		0
<i>LEGAC</i>	0	0		0
<i>PDEM</i>	0	0		0
<i>YoD</i>	0	0		0
<i>EUCON</i>	0	0		0
<i>PI</i>	1	1		0
<i>EDISP</i>	0	0		0
<i>PCON</i>	0	1		1
<i>POL</i>	1	1		0
<i>PARL</i>	0	0		0
<i>PFUND</i>	1	1		0

	SER	ROM		BUL
PSI	0	1		0
<i>WEALTH</i>	0	0		0
<i>ERCON</i>	0	1		1
<i>CCUM</i>	0	0		0
<i>PCUL</i>	0	0		0
<i>LEGAC</i>	0	0		0
<i>PDEM</i>	0	0		0
<i>YoD</i>	0	0		1
<i>EUCON</i>	0	0		0
<i>PI</i>	1	1		0
<i>EDISP</i>	0	0		1
<i>PCON</i>	0	1		1
<i>POL</i>	1	1		1
<i>PARL</i>	0	0		0
<i>PFUND</i>	1	1		0